Enforce image safety during image_conversion #10
Merged
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This does two things:
types of images. Nova and Cinder do this already to prevent an
arbitrary (and trivial to accomplish) host file exposure exploit.
files can name arbitrary files on disk as extents, providing the
same sort of attack. Default that list to just the types we believe
are actually useful for openstack, and which are monolithic.
The configuration option to specify allowed subtypes is added in
glance's config and not in the import options so that we can extend
this check later to image ingest. The format_inspector can tell us
what the type and subtype is, and we could reject those images early
and even in the case where image_conversion is not enabled.
Closes-Bug: #1996188
Change-Id: Idf561f6306cebf756c787d8eefdc452ce44bd5e0
(cherry picked from commit 0d6282a)
(cherry picked from commit 4967ab6)